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L JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter "Defendant") seeks review of the Third District 
Court's denial of her Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
EL STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) when Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing until 
after the hearing was held, promptly responded upon receipt of the notice by filing its Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment! The District Court denied Defendant's Motion under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), stating that the court did not belief Defendant's excuse for 
missing the evidentiary hearing and the Defendant failed to present a meritorious defense. 
See R. 127-128, Appellant preserved this issue for appeal in her Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and her Reply Memorandum in Support of Default 
Judgment. See R. 74-77 andR. 95-101, In reviewing a Rule 60(b) refusal to vacate a default 
judgment, an appellate court employs the abuse of discretion standard. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 
75, 11 P.3d 277, 280 (Utah 2000). 
I l l DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 - Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency 
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of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed 
in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant entered into a contract to sell a 2004 Chevrolet Tahoe ("vehicle") to 
Plaintiff for the amount of $35,000. Both parties were in agreement with the terms of the 
contract. Plaintiff performed on the contract by initially providing $15,000.00 towards the 
contract price for the vehicle. The payment plan called for Plaintiff to make payments after 
the initial lump sum. Plaintiff was delinquent in these payments and the vehicle was 
repossessed at Defendant's request. 
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On December 29,2004, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Third District Court, from 
which this appeal is taken. Defendant failed to answer the Complaint. Defendant received 
notice of the matter on or about March 28, 2005. Plaintiff moved for default judgment on 
April 18,2005. Default Judgment was not entered by the court for reasons stated in the April 
28,2005, Minute Entry. The Court stated that it "will not make findings without testimony, 
exhibit A was not attached to complaint and punitive damages needs an evidentiary hearing." 
In response to this entry, an evidentiary hearing was scheduled for June 24,2005. Defendant 
received no notice of this hearing. 
At this hearing, the Court heard proffer from counsel for the Plaintiff and found fraud 
and misrepresentation on the part of the Defendant. In addition, the Court heard testimony 
from Mr. Pilon. Damages were awarded to Plaintiff in an amount of $35,000 plus costs, 
$17,500 of which were punitive. This order was filed July 5, 2005. Defendant was not 
present at this hearing. Defendant did not receive notice of the evidentiary hearing until the 
first week of July. She filed an affidavit to that effect. There was no contradictory 
testimony. 
The same date that judgment was entered, July 6, 2005, Defendant filed her Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment. Both parties agree that the motion was timely filed. Counsel 
for Defendant made its appearance at this time. In its Motion, Defendant argued that Rule 
60(b) allows for default judgments to be set aside where either (1) excusable neglect is found 
or (2) additional factors that justify relief from judgment. Defendant was not provided notice 
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of the evidentiary hearing where the default judgment was ordered. Defendant has not been 
provided adequaite opportunity to respond to the allegations against her. This Motion was 
fully briefed and oral arguments were held September 26, 2005. 
The judge denied the Defendant's Motion. The judge premised his denial of the 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment upon Defendant's failure to raise a meritorious 
defense in its motion and Defendant's failure to respond to the Complaint. The Defendant 
comes before this Court to appeal the denial of its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
V. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about September 23,2004 the parties entered into a written agreement whereby 
Defendant sold Plaintiff a 2003 Chevrolet Tahoe for the price of $35,000.00. See R. 11J3; andR. 
66W-
2. Under the terms of the written agreement, Plaintiff was to make a down payment of 
$15,000.00 concurrent with delivery of the Chevrolet Tahoe on or about September 23, 2004. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff was to pay one (1) monthly installment of $2,000.00 followed by four (4) 
monthly installments of $3,000.00, followed by three (3) monthly installments of $2,000.00 until the 
balance of $35,000.00 was paid to Defendant by May of 2005. See R. 1-2 f4; and R. 66 Tf4. 
3. Plaintiff took possession of the Chevrolet Tahoe on or about September 23,2004 and 
paid Defendant $15,000.00 via money order concurrently therewith. Defendant did not deliver a 
written title to the vehicle at that time. See R. 2 ]f5; andR. 66 f5. 
4. Plaintiff paid an additional $2,500.00 to Defendant in or about October, 2004. See 
R. 2%1; andR. 66\1-
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5. On or about December 21, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Complaint alleging breach of 
contract, fraud, fraudulent concealment, unjust enrichment and conversion on the part of the 
Defendant. See R. 2-5. 
6. Defendant was personally served with the Complaint. See R. 9 ^2-3. 
7. Plaintiff requested a default judgment be entered due to Defendant's failure to answer 
the Complaint. See R. 20-2L 
8. The Court would not enter a default judgment absent a hearing regarding damages. 
See R. 28. 
9. An evidentiary hearing was held on or about June 24, 2005. See R. 123. 
10. Defendant did not receive notice of this hearing. See R. 93-94. 
11. At this hearing the district court judge heard testimony from the Plaintiff, Plaintiff s 
counsel and Terry Pilon. 
12. The district court found that Defendant breached the contract, defrauded the Plaintiff 
and was unjustly enriched. See R. 68 ^|27. 
13. Plaintiff was granted a judgment in the amount of $35,352.50. See R. 69 [^32. 
14. Default judgment was entered July 5, 2005. See R. 71-72. 
15. On July 6, 2005 Defendant filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. See R. 
74-77. 
16. The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was fully briefed and oral argument was 
heard on September 26, 2005 before the Honorable Judge Stephen Roth. See R. 113-115. 
17. At this hearing, Judge Roth denied Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. See R. 123; R. 127-128; andR. 130. 
18. Defendant filed its Notice of Appeal on November 3, 2005. See R. 134-135. 
VI SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court improperly denied Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. Utah courts favor setting aside default judgments so that cases may be decided 
on the merits. A party should be given the opportunity to fully participate in an adjudication 
of all matters raised in a Complaint. Defendant was deprived of that opportunity. Defendant 
does not dispute her failure to respond to the Complaint. Defendant's appeal focuses on the 
damage hearing held on June 24, 2005. Defendant was not provided notice of the hearing. 
At this hearing, the district court judge heard proffer from counsel and found fraud on the 
part of the Defendant. As stated, Defendant was without an opportunity to defend the 
allegations. From this hearing, the Court entered its default judgment. 
Defendant raised her Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment timely and stated her 
reason supporting the setting aside of the judgment. The District Court found that Defendant 
failed to raise a meritorious defense in her Motion. The court found this flaw to be fatal to 
the motion. Defendant acknowledges that a meritorious defense must be asserted in order 
to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(1) excusable neglect. However, a meritorious defense was 
asserted to the best of Defendant's ability under the constrained time frame of the case. 
Defendant filed her Motion the same day the order was filed with the court. Defendant met 
the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1) in order to set aside the default judgment to the extent 
available at the time. 
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The District Court focused solely on Defendant's request for relief based upon 
excusable neglect. Defendant also raised its Motion under Rule 60(b)(6). This allows relief 
for any other reason justifying relief from an order. Defendant did not receive notice of the 
evidentiaiy hearing held on June 24,2005. At this hearing, the Court heard testimony based 
on impermissible hearsay. Following this hearing, the Court entered the Default Judgment. 
Defendant was not provided an opportunity to respond. The denial of an opportunity to 
present evidence and defenses at the evidentiary hearing is sufficient to justify relief from the 
order of the court. Where Defendant's Motion was timely and set forth reasons justifying 
relief, the Motion should have been granted, either under Rule 60(b)(1) excusable neglect or 
Rule 60(b)(6) additional factors, in order for the Court to make a full adjudication of the 
dispute on the merits. 
VEL ARGUMENT 
A. UTAH COURTS FAVOR GRANTING RELIEF FROM 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNLESS IT WOULD RESULT IN 
SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE TO THE ADVERSE PARTY 
Utah Courts are generally in favor of setting aside default judgments where there is 
a reasonable excuse for defendant's failure and when application is timely. Katz v. Pierce, 
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Both parties agree that the application was timely filed. 
Discretion is placed in the district court judge to determine whether a reasonable excuse 
exists. Id. Abuse of discretion on the part of the judge must be clearly shown. Id. Finally, 
"when there is doubt about whether a default should be set aside, that doubt should be 
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resolved in favor of doing so." Id. "The courts will generally grant relief in doubtful cases 
so that a party may have a hearing." Board of Education of Granite School DisL v. Cox, 14 
Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 807 (1963). In this case the judge abused his discretion in 
denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
B. DEFENDANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE IN ITS MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 60(b)(1) 
Defendant provided evidence of possible defenses in its Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment to the extent available following the entering of the judgment. Rule 60(b)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to "relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." In State ex rel Utah State Department of 
Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the requirements for 
In order to obtain relief from a default judgment, defendant must show that "the 
judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified 
in Rule 60(b)), but he must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, 
and that he has a meritorious defense to the action." Id. at 1055-6 (citations omitted). See 
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976) overruled in part 
on other grounds. Utah has accepted the rule regarding proposed defenses as set forth in 
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Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1057 (citing Lopez v. Reserve Insurance Co., 525 P.2d 1204, 1206 
(Colo.App.1974): 
A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and 
sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted 
in a judgment different from the one entered. 
See also Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974); Beckett v. Cosby, 73 
Wash.2d 825, 440 P.2d 831 (1968). 
Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing until after the hearing was conducted. 
This is clearly an example of excusable neglect which would justify the Court in setting aside 
the default judgment. The district court found otherwise, citing the lack of an explanation 
as to why notice was not received. If Defendant was aware of the reason why notice was not 
received, such mistake could be referenced and corrected. However, where Defendant has 
no knowledge as to why notice of the hearing was not received until after the entry of the 
judgment, excusable neglect may be imparted to the Defendant. 
It is important to note that Footnote 2 of the Utah Supreme Court opinion in Katz, 732 
P.2d 92 (1986) provides direction to the district court judge in determining whether a 
reasonable justification or excuse exists. Footnote 2 states: 
The trial court has broad discretion to balance the equities on a 
case-by-case basis, including such considerations as the 
preference to allow the presentation of all claims and defenses, 
any delay or unfairness of a party's conduct, the need for finality 
of judgments, and the respective harsdships in denying or 
granting relief. 
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Id. See Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953); Boyce v. Boyce, 
609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980); Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 
429 (1973). In making the decision whether to set aside a default judgment, the court must 
consider each of the factors listed in Katz. This list is not conclusive. Additional factors 
exist which would show reasonable justification for setting aside default judgment. In this 
matter, Defendant was not allowed to present her claims, it was Plaintiffs responsibility to 
notify Defendant of the June 24,2005 hearing, and judgment was entered against Defendant. 
This is a clear illustration of the hardships placed upon Defendant in the matter. 
The district court judge also found that Defendant failed to set forth in sufficient detail 
any meritorious defense to the action. In hastening to respond to the hearing, Defendant did 
not describe such defenses in her Motion. However, the judge was able to hear a description 
of those meritorious defenses at oral argument held September 26, 2005. Counsel for 
Defendant pointed out several discrepancies at the evidentiary hearing, including 
impennissible hearsay on the part of Terry Pilon, that are able to be rectified by setting aside 
the default judgment. Provision of meritorious defenses is not solely limited to the pleadings 
regarding setting aside default judgment, but may also be provided through oral argument 
on the motion. 
The provision of meritorious defenses at oral argument should have been found 
sufficient to support Defendant's claim of excusable neglect. The district court judge abused 
his discretion in finding otherwise. For the reasons stated above, Defendant requests this 
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Court to set aside the default judgment and order that a new evidentiary hearing be conducted 
in this matter. 
C. DENIAL OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS 
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULE 60(b)(6) 
The denial of an opportunity for Defendant to present her defenses to the allegations 
raised in the Complaint is sufficient to justify relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(6) additional factors justifying relief. Rule 60(b0(6) allows relief from a judgment for 
"(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6) requires "[fjirst that the reason be one other than those listed in subdivision 
(1) through [(6)]1; second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be made 
within a reasonable time." Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382,387 
(Utah 1991) (emphasis in original) (citing Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 
1304, 1306-07 (Utah 1982). Defendant acknowledges that this subsection should be 
"cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court only in unusual and exceptional instances." 
Id. (quotmgHughes v. Sanders, 287 F.Supp. 332,334 (E.D. Okla.1968)). Failure to provide 
notice of a dispositive hearing is sufficient to justify the court granting relief based upon Rule 
60(b)(6). 
lUtah Rules of Civil Procedure 60 was amended effective April 1, 1998. Prior subsection 
(b)(7) was renumbered as (b)(6). The text of the subsection did not change. 
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Defendant provided sufficient information in her pleadings and at oral argument to 
justify relief based on Rule 60(b)(6). The Defendant should have been provided an 
opportunity to present all claims and defenses. Setting aside the default judgment would 
provide a hearing for arguments to be heard in order to reach a conclusion to this matter. At 
oral arguments on September 26, 2005, the judge found that setting aside the default 
judgment would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff, whereas Plaintiff had presented her case at the 
June 24, 2005 damage hearing. The district court judge did not properly balance the 
prejudice to the Plaintiff with the prejudice towards the Defendant in denying the Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment. Utah courts favor the resolution of matters through a discussion of the 
merits. Defendant was not provided an opportunity to present her claims and defenses at the 
evidentiary hearing on June 24, 2005, due to lack of notice. Immediately upon obtaining 
knowledge of the proceeding, Defendant filed her Motion. Defendant adequately presented 
her claims in support of its claim for excusable neglect in its pleadings and at oral argument. 
The claims presented in Defendant's pleadings and at oral argument are sufficient to justify 
relief from the default judgment 
Based on the above, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to dismiss the District 
Court's decision denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, and order an 
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evidentiary hearing be held where Defendant may present her case and this matter may be 
decided on the merits. 
DATED this \p day of April, 2006. 
SUITTERAXLAND 
By: h, 
'Cevin D. Swenson 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant Mishel 
Minnock 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MISTY L. FISHER, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MISCHEL MINNOCK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 040927544 
Judge Stephen Roth 
THIS MATTER came for an evidentiary hearing on June 24, 2005, the Honorable Stephen Roth 
presiding. The issue at bar was that of Plaintiffs damages pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55. 
Those present included: Stephen D. Spencer, counsel for Plaintiff; and Plaintiff Defendant did not 
appear personally or through counsel. Terry Pilon of Fun Unlimited II Inc. was also present as a witness. 
The Court reviewed the file in this matter and heard the proffers and arguments of counsel. Wherefore, 
being fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Mischell Minnock is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. The relevant events alleged have occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
FILED.DISTRICT COSSET 
T U]p Jfiiif yuffdia[ District 
3. On September 23, 2004 the parties entered into a written agreement whereby Defendant 
sold Plaintiff a 2003 Chevrolet Tahoe for the price of $35,000.00. 
4. Under the terms of the written agreement, Plaintiff was to make a down payment of 
$15,000.00 concurrent with delivery of the Chevrolet Tahoe on September 23, 2004. Thereafter, 
Plaintiff was to pay one (1) monthly installment of $2,000.00 followed by four (4) monthly installments 
of $3,000.00, followed by three (3) monthly installments of $2,000.00 until the balance of $35,000.00 
was paid to Defendant by May of 2005. 
5. Plaintiff took possession of the Chevrolet Tahoe on September 23, 2004 and paid 
Defendant $15,000.00 via money order concurrently therewith. Defendant did not deliver a written title 
to the vehicle at that time. 
6. Defendant did not inform Plaintiff that a purchase money lien for the vehicle had already 
been given to General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) or that the payments for the vehicle 
were already in default at relevant times. Further, Defendant did not inform Plaintiff that Defendant had 
no intention of making payments to GMAC from the money Defendant had received and was to receive 
from Plaintiff. 
7. Plaintiff paid an additional $2,500.00 to Defendant in October, 2004. 
8. In November 2004, Plaintiff learned that Defendant had given a purchase money lien in 
favor of GMAC and further, that Defendant was in default on the promissory note and contract for 
Defendant's purchase of the vehicle. 
9. In December 2004, Plaintiff allowed GMAC or its agents to repossess the vehicle upon 
learning of its purchase money lien and that the remaining purchase money owed by Defendant for the 
vehicle was approximately $17,000.00. 
10. Through the parties' actions described herein, each made a promise to perform for which 
consideration was given. 
11. Plaintiff adequately performed under the parties' agreement by paying $ 17,500.00 to 
Defendant at relevant times. 
12. Defendant breached the parties' agreement, inter alia, by failing to deliver title to the 
vehicle. 
13. As a direct result of Defendant's breach of the parties' agreement, Plaintiff has been 
harmed in the amount of $17,500.00. 
14. Through her actions described herein, Defendant made a representation concerning a 
presently existing material fact; which was false; which Defendant either knew to be false, or made 
recklessly, knowing that she had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; for the 
purpose of inducing Plaintiff to act upon it, to wit: that Defendant would deliver title to the Chevrolet 
Tahoe to the Plaintiff. 
15. Plaintiff, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; did in fact rely upon it and was 
thereby induced to act to her injury and damage in the amount of $ 17,500.00. 
16. Through her acts and omissions described herein, Defendant failed to disclose 
information that was material to Plaintiffs decision to enter the parties' agreement, to wit: that GMAC 
had a purchase money lien on the Chevrolet Tahoe; that the payments under Defendant's purchase 
money contract with GMAC were in default; that Defendant had no intention of using monies paid by 
the Plaintiff to satisfy Defendant's obligation to GMAC. 
17. The nondisclosed information was material to the formation of the agreement. 
18. The nondisclosed information was known to the Defendant at relevant times. 
19. Defendant had a legal duty to communicate with Plaintiff regarding the lien in favor of 
GMAC and Defendant's obligation to GMAC that was in default at relevant times. 
20. Plaintiff has conferred a benefit on Defendant. 
21. Defendant has knowledge of the benefit conferred by Plaintiff. 
22. There has been an acceptance or retention by the Defendant under such circumstances as 
to make it inequitable for the Defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value. 
23. Through Defendant's acts as described herein, Defendant has intentionally and without 
lawful justification deprived Plaintiff use and possession of $17,500.00. 
24. Defendant's use of Plaintiff s property is inconsistent with the Plaintiffs rights. 
25. Plaintiff has paid sales tax for the purchase of the amount of $1,185.50 to the State of 
Utah of which she has been refunded $980.00, the difference being $197.50. 
26. Plaintiff has incurred a cost of the filing fee in this action in the amount of $155.00. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
27. Defendant has breached a contract with Plaintiff; has defrauded Plaintiff; and has been 
unjustly enriched at Plaintiffs expense. Defendant's conduct has been willful and malicious. 
28. Plaintiff should be granted a judgment against Defendant in the amount of $17,500.00 as 
consequential damages. 
29. Plaintiff should be granted a judgment against Defendant for $17,500.00 as punitive 
damages to deter future conduct and because Defendant's conduct has been knowing and in reckless 
disregard for the rights of others. 
30. Plaintiff should be granted a judgment against Defendant for Motor Vehicle Fees and 
Sales Tax that have not been recovered in the amount of $197.50. 
31. Plaintiff should be granted a judgment against Defendant for costs in the amount of 
$155.00. 
32. The grand total of Plaintiff s Judgment against Defendant should be $35,352.50. 
DATED this J A day of ^-KUlCn ,2005. 
BY THE CO 
The Honorable Stephen Roth, .^^ ; 
Third District Court Judge • ••'• . -;^rv 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am an employee or partner of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C. and that I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be placed in 
the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mischel Minnock 
7845 South Abercrombie Lane 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Court; client 
ON this Zi day of June, 2005. 
Vanessa Stewart 
Paralegal for Stephen D. Spencer 
ATTACHMENT #2 
Stephen D.Spencer (8913) 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
Fax:(801)262-6758 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MISTY L.FISHER, I ORDER 
09/26/2005 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MISCHEL MINNOCK, Case No. 040927544 
Judge Stephen Roth 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER came for a hearing on September 26, 2005, the Honorable Stephen Roth 
presiding. Those present included: Plaintiff; Michael E. Day of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C, 
substituting for Stephen D. Spencer, attorney for Plaintiff; and Kevin D. Swensoa, attorney for 
Defendant. The Defendant was not personally present. The motion at bar was Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment, which was filed July 6, 2005. Plaintiff had filed a memorandum in opposition 
on July 12, 2005. Defendant had filed a reply memorandum on July 18, 2005. The Court reviewed the 
motion and the file in this matter and heard the proffers and arguments of counsel. Wherefore, being 
fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby ORDERS the following: 
1. Defendant's motion is denied. 
DONE this day of , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Stephen Roth 
Third District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am an employee or partner of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C. and that I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to be placed in the United States Mail, first class, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kevin D. Swenson 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Court; client 
ON this 2A0 day of September, 2005. 
Vanessa Stewart 
Paralegal for Stephen D. Spencer 
